Abstract
Introduction

19
There are two important normative traditions in modern public finance theory. On one side is 20 the Pigouvian tradition which looks at the structure of government from the perspective of a 21 benevolent social planner.
1 On the other is the Public Choice tradition, especially the work of
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F 68
Background
69
Our political model is a version of the political agency models introduced by Barro (1973) and 70 Ferejohn (1986) , recently reviewed in Besley (2006) . This approach captures the idea that the 71 quality of government hinges on the ability of voters to deal with the principal agent problem that 72 they face vis a vis public officials. Moreover, it is an approach which allows the Pigouvian model 73 and the Public Choice models of government to be represented as limiting cases. In addition to 74 their theoretical attractions, the central predictions of these models have received support from 75 empirical analysis of political decision-making and voter behavior. For example, Peltzman (1992) 76 found that voters respond negatively to spending increases at the state and federal levels in the U.
77
S. Besley and Case (1995a) showed that voters in gubernatorial elections evaluate incumbent This paper is related to previous work linking efficient taxation and policy outcomes. In one 84 important contribution, Becker and Mulligan (1998) consider how changing the efficiency of the 85 tax system alters the resources devoted to political influence. If greater deadweight cost in the tax 86 system leads to reductions in influence activities that more than offset the direct costs to taxpayers 87 then it can be good from a societal point of view. Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1996) argue 88 that income taxation can be attractive relative to consumption taxation even when the latter has 89 less deadweight loss since it leads to a lower level of transfer activity in equilibrium. Our political 90 model differs from those employed in previous papers on this issue. One virtue of our approach is
91
showing how the case for efficient taxation depends on whether the political system is closer to 92 the Pigouvian or Public Choice world.
93
Whether to introduce formal limits on the size of government is a staple issue of the public 94 choice literature. The case for this has been made forcefully by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and 95 Wilson (1989) . However, they study the issue using the Leviathan model in which governments 96 seek to maximize the size of the public sector and electoral pressures serve no role in curbing 97 behavior. A number of U.S. states have adopted measures which curb the growth of government 98 by limiting taxes (see Rueben, 1997) . This is premised on some weakness in the electoral process 99 which prevents normal electoral channels from effectively representing voter interests.
100
The main ideas apply to thinking about the importance of transparency in government. 
101
Greater transparency can reduce the incentives for bad politicians to try to convince voters that 102 they are good since they are more likely to be found out when pursuing such strategies. Thus,
103
increased transparency can actually lead to worse incumbent discipline. The flip side of this is 104 better selection, as bad politicians are more often "found out". The balance of these selection and 105 incentive effects determine whether greater information provision is good for voters. 4 
106
The approach also casts light on debates about the value of competitive governments. There 107 are two main dimensions. First, we show that the results on inefficient taxation can be interpreted 3 Transparency is one among a variety of budgetary institutions which have concerned analysts -see Poterba and von Hagen (1999) for a variety of studies. Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2003) demonstrate the empirical relevance of fiscal transparency in OECD countries.
4 Prat (2002) and Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) also consider the value of information in agency models without commitment. They also show that less information for principals may sometimes be better.
is an election in which a voter chooses between the incumbent and a challenger. Specifically, in 126 each period, the politician observes the unit cost θ of providing a public good and then unilaterally 127 chooses the quantity of the good provided G and the amount of rent diversion for private purposes, 128 or "waste," s. Total government spending for the period (equal to tax collections) is then x = θG + s.
129
The cost of the public good is independently and identically distributed in each period, with 130 θ ∈ {L, H}, H N L, and Pr(θ = H) = q. The representative voter derives utility from public goods, net 131 of the cost of government spending. When the politician provides public goods in the amount G 132 and total spending is x, the welfare of the voter is W(G, x) = G − μC(x), where C is a strictly convex, 133 increasing function and μ is an exogenous parameter that indexes the marginal cost of public funds 134 in a simple way. 5 In debates about the role of tax competition, the Leviathan model of government due to Brennan and Buchanan (1980) has played a key role. This model is based on the notion that government would seek to maximize the tax revenues extracted from its citizens. Moreover, because citizens find it difficult to control the behavior of (self-interested) officials, government spending and tax rates tend to exceed efficient levels. By creating downward pressure on tax rates, then, tax competition may supplement the limited constitutional means available to taxpayers to constrain their political leaders. This argument was further explored in Edwards and Keen (1996) . Wilson (2000) provides an alternative model in which competition can induce greater public spending to attract mobile capital if the latter raises the productivity of capital located in a particular jurisdiction. Janeba and Schjelderup (2004) consider an explicit model of tax competition and electoral incentives that is complementary to our work. 6 Sorting out the welfare consequences of intergovernmental competition is of more than academic interest. The received wisdom is that increased economic integration among nations in recent years has increased the mobility of tax bases across national borders, with "tax competition" among governments attempting to attract mobile tax basesparticularly capital income -by lowering rates below efficient levels. In response to this OECD (1998) developed guidelines for eliminating "harmful tax competition" among member nations. However, the report contained a dissenting appendix by the government of Switzerland arguing that "competition in tax matters…discourages governments from adopting confiscatory fiscal regimes, which hamper entrepreneurial spirit and hurt the economy, and it avoids alignment of tax burdens at the highest level." (p. 77). The recent OECD stance has softened -with initiatives aimed more at eliminating "harmful tax practices" -the stance on tax competition is more agnostic. 7 The theory of yardstick competition is also studied in Bordignon et al. (2001) , Hindriks and Belleflamme (2001) The foregoing structure defines a game of incomplete information between the incumbent 172 politician and the representative voter. We seek to characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria of this 8 Thus, the good politician is a non-strategic agent in the reputational game we study. For a partial analysis of what may happen in our model when the good type also behaves strategically, see Lockwood (2005) . 9 At the cost of some additional complexity, our model could be extended to an infinite horizon setting, in which each incumbent serves at most two terms in office. Likewise, by taking the proportion of good types in the pool of available candidates to be fixed, we abstract from issues of ex ante selection of those who choose to stand for office. These issues are addressed using a model related to ours in Besley (2004).
game. As usual, the game is most easily solved by applying a type of backward induction. In the 174 second period, the politician in office faces no further possibility of electoral discipline. Thus 175 s 2 = X for i = b (bad politicians take maximal rents) while s 2 = 0 for i = g. Given s 2 , the politician 176 chooses G to maximize voter welfare.
177
Given that second-period strategies are identical for challenger and incumbent, the 178 sequentially rational voting rule for the voter is to re-elect the incumbent if the posterior 179 probability the incumbent is the good type exceeds the prior probability π that the challenger is Bayes' rule at nodes not reached in equilibrium. Since the good type's actions are pinned down by 187 our preference assumption, we impose the minimal restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that "pool" with type (g, H), and doing so may be desirable, if it brings a positive probability of re-200 election. Accordingly, let
denote the probability type (b, L) exercises restraint in this sense, and let σ denote the probability 203 of re-election when the voter observes x H . The posterior probability that spending x H was 204 generated by a good politician is H ). Second, equilibrium may be separating, as type (b, L) chooses s 1 = X and is revealed ex post.
214
Third, equilibrium may be a hybrid one, in which type (b, L) adopts a strictly mixed strategy on 215 actions s 1 = ŝ and s 1 = X, so that type is revealed with positive probability strictly less than one.
216
The following result fully characterizes the possible configurations.
217
Lemma 1. An equilibrium exists for all values of parameters and is generically unique. obtain if voter could observe the cost shock directly.) In the pooling and hybrid equilibria, the 230 incumbent is taking less than maximal rents and his type of revealed with lower probability. 11 The 231 latter is most likely when ŝ(μ) is high and the incumbent discounts the future a great deal so that 232 he prizes rents earned in period one.
233
This framework implies a somewhat more optimistic view of politics than is standard in the 
Selection and incentives
241
To understand how the electoral process affects political decision-making in the model, it is 242 useful to calculate expected voter welfare in equilibrium. As a benchmark for the analysis, welfare when type g is in office would then be EW g = qW H g + (1 − q)W L g , whereas welfare with b 245 in office would simply be W b = − μC(X ), since "lame-duck" bad politicians divert maximal rents.
246
To simplify notation, let
period welfare in this case. It follows that the present value of expected welfare is just (1 + β) 248 W 0 (μ) when there is no chance of re-election.
11 Note however that in the pooling equilibrium the outcome is similar to that assumed in the Leviathan model of the Public Choice tradition, where rents are often assumed to be positively related to the level of "legitimate" public spending.
Equilibrium welfare in the equilibrium described in Lemma 1 can be written as and π 2 is the equilibrium probability a good politician is in office in period 2, given by the fact that elections improve the quality of period two policy by weeding out bad incumbents.
262
Multiplying each effect is the probability that the relevant events occur and these benefits of elections 263 are reaped. With probability (1 − π)(1 − q)λ, the first-period incumbent chooses to produce G H ⁎ of the 264 public good and divert rents ŝ instead of X, resulting in the welfare gain from "discipline". The 265 expression π 2 − π is in turn the increased confidence that the period two incumbent is good.
12
266
In summary, the possibility of re-electing incumbents can increase voter welfare both by improving 267 average quality of office-holders (the "selection effect") and by offering prospective incentives for 268 low-quality incumbents (the "discipline effect"). To understand the impact of changes in the fiscal 269 regime, the effects on selection and incentives in elections must be understood. This in turn requires 270 understanding how equilibrium political behavior (as represented by λ and σ) is affected. 
The case for inefficient taxation 272
We now turn to the effect of tax efficiency on voter welfare. The comparative static that we 273 perform could be interpreted in one of four ways: (i) an intensification of tax competition (ii) 274 passage of a citizens' initiative which restricts the use of a specific tax instrument (iii) passage of a 275 constitutional restriction which restricts the tax base (iv) technological change in the ability to 276 collect taxes. 13 In all four cases, we expect the cost of public funds to change.
277
We now consider how an increase in the marginal cost of public funds changes voter welfare.
278
Specifically, we consider an exogenous increase in the parameter μ. Expected rent diversion is 279 decreasing in μ in the pooling and hybrid equilibria, since
By reducing the level of spending by benevolent governments, increasing inefficiency in the 12 To interpret this expression, observe that the probability of Type I and Type II errors in voter's re-election decision, given the equilibrium strategies, are given bỹ aðk; rÞuPrðre À electjbÞ ¼ ð1−qÞkr bðk; rÞuPrðdo not re À electjgÞ ¼ qð1−rÞ
13 Peltzman (1980) marginal cost of public funds only make the cost of funding public spending in this state larger.
296
The key assumption in Proposition 1 is that equilibrium strategies remain unchanged.
297
However, this need not be so and, if it is not the case, there are two competing effects to consider.
298
First, the equilibrium can induce a change in strategy that leads to more information about the 299 incumbent being revealed and, second, the rent extracted by politicians may change.
300
Returning to Lemma 1, it is clear that increasing inefficiencies in the tax system can lead to a move 301 from a pooling or hybrid equilibrium to a separating equilibrium. Specifically, defining μ _ from ŝ(μ)=
302
(1−β)X, then for all μ N μ _ , there will be separation between the good and bad incumbents. This an increase in the inefficiency of the tax system which moves the equilibrium from hybrid or 317 pooling to separating may increase voter welfare. Moreover π ⁎ b 1 if β is sufficiently close to one.
319
This result says that an increase in the inefficiency of the tax system can enhance voter welfare 320 only if it leads to an increase in the ability of the voter to detect bad incumbents. increasing the marginal cost of public funds will increase political turnover as bad politicians are 331 less likely to pool with good ones. Second, the effect on the size of government is ambiguous.
332
This depends on the fractions of good and bad politicians in the data -the negative direct effect 333 could be offset by a positive political equilibrium effect.
334
Other restraints 335
The key to understanding whether it is ever optimal to use inefficient taxation rested on the 336 balance of discipline and selection effects. We now apply these ideas to three further examples.
337
For simplicity, we consider in this section the case where q N 1/2. Lemma 1 now implies that only 
Limiting the power to tax
342
Changing the marginal cost of public funds could be seen as a crude means of restraining waste 343 in government -after all, it changes the behavior of good and bad incumbents alike. Consider 344 instead a constitutional restriction on X, the maximum tax level that the government can levy.
345
This has the advantage of reducing the rent seeking that a bad politician does when the state is 346 θ = H and hence improving voter welfare (assuming that the limitation does not distort the 347 behavior of good politicians). However, it reduces both the discipline and selection effects -348 since bad politicians are no longer as bad as they were previously. Overall, it is straightforward to 349
show that a tax limitation that leaves the behavior of the good politicians unaltered and does not 350 change the political equilibrium is welfare improving for the voter.
351
The more interesting case is where the tax limitation shifts the political equilibrium.
14
352
Lemma 1 makes clear why the effect of lowering X is to increase the incentive of incumbents 353 to pool, and so to make the political equilibrium less informative. This has the opposite effect 354 to that of increasing μ, the marginal cost of public funds. This suggests that a tax limitation 355 will be attractive when selection is less important than discipline -i.e., when βπS( μ) b D(μ).
356
Thus, a tax limitation is more likely to be desirable when there is a predominance of self-
357
interested politicians -when π is small. This is more in line with the traditional Public Choice 358 view.
359
Thus, we have:
360
Proposition 3. Suppose that a limit is imposed on the size of government (as measured by X).
361
Then there exists a π such that voter welfare increases if π b π .
363
This illustrates the subtle differences between the welfare effects of different types of fiscal 364 restraint. It also illustrates the importance of analyzing the detailed effect of political incentives in 365 response to the imposition of restraints.
14 Here we consider only the case where the maximum spending level X remains high enough to leave the behavior of good politicians unchanged. commonly thought that this will lead to an increase in voter welfare.
379
Suppose now that, after the incumbent has chosen s 1 and before the period one election is held, 
385
Moreover, pooling is less likely to be optimal the closer is ξ to one. Indeed, if ξ = 1, then the only 386 possible period one equilibrium is separating.
15
387
Better information therefore tends to reduce discipline and increase first-term rent seeking. At 
400
The above expression reveals the determinants of this trade-off. The selection effect is larger,
401
the better is the pool of incumbents (π close to one) and the lower the level of discounting.
402
This result suggests that, in political agency models, more information need not be desirable
403
for voters. This is related to the broader theoretical literature on the value of information in agency 404 relationships. In the standard complete contracts model of Holmstrom (1979) , more information 405 is better. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) show that coarser information may sometimes be 406 better in motivating agents in a career concerns model where incentives are implicit. This reflects 15 A similar argument can be made if we instead supposed that with some probability information about whether s 1 is positive comes to light before the election.
a kind of second-best reasoning -with incomplete incentives, an otherwise welfare improving 408 change (more information) may have deleterious effects on equilibrium behavior that more than 409 offset the direct welfare impact. In our model, incentives are incomplete since the threat of not 410 being re-elected is the only mechanism with which the voter may discipline incumbents. jurisdictions. Accordingly, let the probability of re-election in the domestic jurisdiction be σ(x, x′) 438 when observed spending levels in the domestic and foreign jurisdictions are x and x′ respectively.
439
We say the voter's strategy involves yardstick competition when re-election occurs with positive 440 probability if spending is high in both jurisdictions, but the probability of re-election is zero if 441 domestic spending is high and foreign spending is low. That is, a re-election rule with yardstick 442 competition has σ(x H , x H ) = σ for some σ N 0 and σ(x H , x L ) = 0.
17
443
As before, let λ denote the probability type (b, L) chooses s 1 = ŝ. Since we look for an 444 equilibrium in which the strategies adopted by domestic and foreign incumbents are symmetric 16 Holmstrom (1982) gives the classic treatment in an agency model. Meyer and Vickers (1997) consider these issues in a model of regulation a context in which yardstick competition is widely used. 17 Of course, σ(x L , x′) = 1 in equilibrium for all x′, as in the unilateral model of Section 3. where ℓ(λ, ρ, π) is the likelihood ratio that (x H , x H ) was generated by a bad rather than good that (x H , x H ) was generated by a bad incumbent. This is because, at low π, (x H , x H ) is more likely 461 generated by a foreign bad incumbent with cost of L than a foreign good incumbent with a cost of 462 H. But with positive correlation in costs, it is also more likely that the cost at home is L and hence 463 that the domestic incumbent is bad.
464
A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium with yardstick competition to exist is 465 that Pr(g|x H , x L ) b π, so that the voter prefers to remove the incumbent from office when domestic 466 spending is high and foreign spending is low. Moreover, the equilibrium is pooling if Pr( g|x H ,
467
x H ) N π for λ = 1, and is hybrid otherwise. After some tedious manipulation, these conditions 468 reduce to a simple one, given in the following result.
469
Lemma 2. Suppose that ŝ(μ) N (1− β)X. Then voters use yardstick competition in equilibrium.
470
Apooling equilibrium exists if and only if π ≥ 1/2, and a hybrid equilibrium exists if and only if π b 1/2.
472
To interpret this, recall that, in the absence of yardstick comparisons, the equilibrium would 473 have bad incumbents choosing x H when the state is θ = L, yielding a pooling equilibrium. Among the most surprising findings is that certain kinds of fiscal restraint are more likely to be a 518 good idea for voters, the closer is politics to the benevolent government ideal. However, this 519 conclusion was shown to vary by the type of restraint being considered. Thus, the analysis stresses 520 the need to think about each type of restraint on its merits. In moving forward, the model has 521 empirical implications tying together electoral accountability, policy choices, and public finance.
522
The kind of piecemeal institutional analysis conducted here is a useful way of addressing some 523 policy issues. But the analysis does not address the form of optimal fiscal constitutions. We take it 524 as a binding constraint on a democratic system that leaders must face periodic elections rather 525 than looking for optimal incentive contracts. Exploring the form of optimal constitutions in a 526 situation of limited information presents a challenging agenda for future research. Proof of Lemma 1. Here we prove the "if" part of the lemma; the converse can be verified by 533 substitution. Suppose that Eq. (4) holds. Then ŝ + βσX ≤ X for all σ ≤ 1, so that λ = 0 is a best 534 response. When λ = 0, Pr(g|x H , x H ) = 1 and voters strictly prefer to re-elect the incumbent when 535 spending is high. This establishes part 3 of the result.
536
When q ≥ 1/2, then Pr(g|x H ) ≥ π for all λ ≤ 1, implying σ = 1 is a best response for voters. Proof of Proposition 1. which is negative since ∂W g ⁎ (θ, μ) / ∂μ b 0 and λ ≤ 1. □
546
Proof of Proposition 2. The only two possible changes in equilibrium strategy are from a 547 pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium or from a hybrid equilibrium to a separating 548 equilibrium. As in the text define μ from s( μ) = (1 − β)X. From Proposition 1, we know that 549 welfare is decreasing locally along the path to μ. For μ N μ, welfare will be at its full information 550 value. We now make use of the following result and its corollary. Comparison of these expressions yields the result. □ In the pooling equilibrium, which exists if π ≥ 1/2, λ = 1, so that Δ N 0. In the hybrid 634 equilibrium, we have λ b 1 and π 2 y ≥ π 2 ny , so that the first term in the expression is negative and the 635 second is non-negative. When π = 0, however, π 2 y = π 2 ny = 0, so that Δ b 0. Since Δ is continuous in 636 π, the result follows. □
